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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Should the jury's factual determination as to whether

plaintiffs have suffered a compensable "taking" by way of an
unreasonable interference, impairment or restriction of their
right of reasonable access or loss of parking be reversed on
appeal where the evidence shows at most conflicting testimony and
reasonable minds might differ as to the outcome?
2.

Should the jury's calculation as to the amount of

severance damages be reversed on appeal merely because reasonable
minds might differ as to the weight to be given to such evidence
when the calculation was based on proper instructions from the
trial court and was supported by competent evidence admitted
without objection?
REFERENCE TO THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals upon which this
petition for writ of certiorari is based is The Carpet Barn v.
State of Utah, 127 Utah Adv. Rpts. 15 (January 24, 1990) which is
attached as part of the Appendix at Exhibit "A."
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals entered its decision in this
matter on January 24, 1990.

The parties stipulated to grant

petitioner/respondent state of Utah an extension of time to and

including March 20, 1990, within which to file its Petition for
Writ of Certiorari in this matter and an order to that effect was
signed by Justice Richard C. Howe on March 9, 1990,

Jurisdiction

to hear the appeal in the above-entitled action is conferred upon
the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5)
(1988) and pursuant to Rule 42 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court.
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
There are no provisions of the Utah Constitution, Utah Code
Annotated or other regulations that are specifically determinative of the issues presented in this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an inverse condemnation action brought by plaintiffs
to recover for the fair market value of property taken by the
inadvertent construction of underground footings and a retaining
wall onto plaintiffs1 property by contractors for the state of
Utah in conjunction with the expansion and widening of the
travelled portion of Redwood Road as it abuts and borders upon
plaintiffs1 property.

Plaintiffs seek damages including the fair

market value of the property actually taken together with a
temporary construction easement and severance damages, if any, to
the remaining land resulting from that minimal physical
encroachment or "taking."

By stipulation of the parties, the
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date of the "taking" was established as of August 27, 1985, for
purposes of valuation and assessment of just compensation.

The

case proceeded to trial on the sole remaining issues of the fair
market value of the property taken and severance damages, if any,
caused to the remainder of plaintiffs1 property by the taking.

A

jury trial was held on September 28, 29 and 30, 1987 in the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, the Honorable
Frank G. Noel presiding.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the

jury returned its special verdict awarding plaintiffs total
damages in the amount of $5,410.00 which consisted of $289.00 as
fair market value for the property actually taken by construction
of the underground footings and retaining wall onto plaintiffs1
property, $578.00 for a temporary construction easement and
$4,583.00 for severance damage to the remaining property as
reflected in the Judgment On Special Verdict dated October 27,
1987, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B to the Appendix.
Following denial of motions for additur or, in the
alternative, new trial, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal to
this Court. The case was then referred to the Court of Appeals
and proceeded to oral argument on October 16, 1989 and the
decision of the Court of Appeals was filed on January 24, 1990,
reversing the trial court on two grounds and remanding for
further proceedings.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiffs have owned the property in question since

approximately 1971 and became aware shortly after that time of
the possibility that it might be necessary for the State of Utah
to utilize its entire right-of-way in order to widen the traveled
portion of Redwood Road (Tr. 4, 45).
2.

The three buildings which comprise the structures on

the Carpet Barn property are located three (3) inches from the
north property line and twenty (20) feet from the south property
line.

The property has a total frontage of approximately one

hundred-ninety-two (192) feet.

The buildings were constructed

twenty (20) feet from the State's existing right-of-way and
thirty-eight (38) feet from the traveled portion of the roadway
prior to the highway expansion project in question (Tr. 42, 114,
275).
3.

From the time of the acquisition of the property by

plaintiffs until the construction of this roadway widening
project, patrons of the Carpet Barn gratuitously used or borrowed
the State's right-of-way, both for the purpose of maneuvering to
obtain ingress and egress from the property and, on occasion, for
parking (Tr. 44-45; 48).
4.

As part of the road widening project, the State

constructed a retaining wall across much of the front of
plaintiffs1 property along the right-of-way and after the
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construction project was completed it was discovered that the
footings and wall had encroached on plaintiffs1 property (Tr. 6263).
5.

Plaintiff Kenneth MacQueen crystallized the real issue

in the case during his testimony as being the interference with
access and loss of parking in front of the building, even if the
project had been redesigned to eliminate the retaining wall and
footings in question in a way so as to not intrude or encroach
upon the plaintiffs1 property (Tr. 48-49).
6.

Customer parking at the Carpet Barn ranges from an

average of four to six cars at any one time on a typical day to
probably ten or eleven at any one time on a busy Saturday.

After

completion of the construction project, parallel parking is
available in the State's right-of-way along the curb and gutter
in front of the building which accommodates up to eight parking
spaces and eleven or twelve stalls are available in the rear of
the building for additional parking for customers (Tr. 51-52;
133) .
7.

Expert testimony was presented both for plaintiffs and

defendant as to the reasonableness of access, with experts for
both parties taking different approaches to the problem while
agreeing that access was not reasonable but disagreeing as to
whether the action of the State in constructing the project in
question was the cause of that problem (Tr. 103; 234-237).
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8.

The plaintiffs1 expert testified that access to the

property was not reasonable after construction of the highway
project (Tr. 103).
9.

The State's expert concluded that access was as

reasonable after the project as it was before with no net gain or
loss on the part of the property owner (Tr. 247).
10.

Expert appraisal testimony was presented both for

plaintiffs and the State of Utah on the issue of damages or just
compensation to be awarded by the jury.

Both appraisers used

essentially the same approach in determining values before and
after the taking as part of the total damages to be awarded
(Trial Exhibits 39 & 49, copies of which are attached as
Exhibits C and D, respectively, to the Appendix).
11.

The State's appraiser testified as to value both before

and after the construction of the project, concluding that the
value was essentially the same except for the amount of the
damages for the taking, which included $289.00 for the value of
the property actually taken by construction and encroachment of
the footings and retaining wall onto plaintiffs1 property,
$578.00 for a temporary construction easement and $4,543.00 as an
award of severance damages representing the difference in value
of the remaining property before and after the taking based on
the cost for landscaping the area in front of the building to
correct any damage caused by construction of the project, which
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testimony was received without objection (T. 292-295; 309-310;
334).
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
Defendant-Respondent State of Utah respectfully submits that
this court should grant its Petition for Writ of Certiorari
because the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case is in
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of
Appeals, prior decisions of this Court and because the case
presents an important question of law which ought to be settled
by this Court.
The issues presented here with respect to claims for loss of
access, loss of parking and amount of severance damages were not
disposed of prior to trial on motion, but thoroughly and
vigorously litigated throughout the course of a three-day jury
trial in which plaintiffs were able to fully present their theory
of the case.

The question of what constitutes reasonable access

under the particular facts and circumstances that apply to a
specific piece of property and the amount of severance damages to
be awarded in the event of a partial taking are unique questions
of fact suited for disposition in the trial court.

That

determination should not be disturbed merely because reasonable
minds might differ as to the outcome or weight to be given the
testimony presented on both sides of the issues.
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POINT I
SHOULD THE JURY'S FACTUAL DETERMINATION AS TO WHETHER
PLAINTIFFS HAVE SUFFERED A COMPENSABLE "TAKING" BY WAY OF A
DEPRIVATION OR SUBSTANTIAL INTERFERENCE WITH THEIR RIGHT OF
REASONABLE ACCESS OR LOSS OF PARKING BE REVERSED ON APPEAL
WHERE THE EVIDENCE SHOWS AT MOST CONFLICTING TESTIMONY
AND REASONABLE MINDS MIGHT DIFFER AS TO THE OUTCOME?
This Court has previously determined that where governmental
action, even though not amounting to a physical taking of
property, effectively deprives a property owner of reasonable
access or otherwise substantially impairs a recognized private
property right appurtenant to an owner's property and thereby
causes peculiar injury, the owner is entitled to compensation.
Hampton v. State Road Commission, 445 P.2d 708 (Utah 1968); Utah
State Road Commission v Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974); Three D
Corp. v Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 1321 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
By this Petition for Writ of Certiorari, the State of Utah
does not ask this Court to re-examine that entire line of cases
with respect to the basic legal principles enunciated.

Rather,

the State respectfully submits this Court should defer to the
specific factual determination made by the jury at trial in this
case based on competent evidence, properly admitted, and with
more than adequate jury instructions which fully presented
plaintiffs1 theory of the case.

Under these circumstances,

plaintiffs have had their day in court on the issues presented
and the jury verdict should not be overturned.
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The case-by-case nature of this factual inquiry has been
explicitly recognized in the prior holdings of this Court and the
Court of Appeals.

In Hampton, supra, this Court reversed a

dismissal of plaintiffs1 claims alleging a substantial and
material impairment of access to their property and remanded to
the trial court, citing as instructive the following language:
Where that authority depends on the ascertainment of the
fact of whether or not there is a 'taking1 the court may
entertain the suit in order to determine what are the facts
and, consequently, whether the authority existed * * *
[Citation omitted].
This case is reversed and remanded for a factual
determination of whether plaintiffs1 property has been
"taken11 by a denial of their free and convenient access to
their property.
445 P.2d at 712. [Emphasis added].
The Court had earlier in its opinion cited with approval
language characterizing the issue as follows:
Further, many cases deal with the rights of an abutting
owner upon a public street or highway and point out that
such right constitutes a property right and is an interest
in land which cannot be taken by condemnation without
payment therefor. Nevertheless, the cases point out that
this right is subject to well-recognized limitations and
exclusions. One of these limitations is that the right of
ingress and egress does not extend to every foot of the
condemnees* frontage, but under the police power of the
State the right may be limited to reasonable access under
the existing facts and circumstances. [Citation omitted].
. . . Every citizen holds his property subject to the valid
exercise of the police power.
445 P.2d at 711. [Emphasis added].
In Miya, supra, this Court expanded that analysis to include
substantial impairment of other recognized private property
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rights appurtenant to land abutting on a public street.

In that

case, this Court refused to disturb the determination of the
trial court with respect to the testimony of expert witnesses on
relevant factors to be taken into account in an award of
severance damages, which included impairment of light and air,
view, privacy and deprivation of access.

526 P.2d at 929.

In Three D Corp., supra, the Court of Appeals reversed a
judgment in favor of Salt Lake City and remanded to the trial
court for a factual determination as to whether the property
owners were entitled to compensation based on substantial
impairment of a right appurtenant to their property.

The Court

of Appeals specifically recognized the fact intensive nature of
this determination and included an admonition which should apply
with equal force and effect in the instant case, recognizing that
trial courts "are in a much better position to evaluate an entire
case, including its nuances and undisclosed pitfalls, then an
appellate court."

752 P.2d at 1326

(citing Halladay v Cluff,

739 P.2d 643, 645 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
The task of applying the decision of the Court of Appeals in
Three D, supra, to the specific facts and circumstances presented
here was complicated by the timing of the issuance of that
decision.

The jury trial in this case took place on September

28-30, 1987.

The decision of the Court of Appeals in Three D

Corp. was issued on April 15, 1988.
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The submission of briefs in

this case took place thereafter, with the filing of appellants1
brief in July of 1988, and all briefing was completed by the end
of September 1988.

However, the opinion of the Court of Appeals

in Three D Corp. was not discussed by either party in their
briefs, which addressed the issues as framed by appellants with
respect to jury instructions, sufficiency of the evidence, the
proper measure of damages and exclusion of evidence.

The case

was cited as supplemental authority on the date of oral argument
before the Court of Appeals on October 16, 1989 and discussed
briefly in oral argument, but not adequately for the purpose of
distinguishing the facts of this case.
Two primary points of distinction should be noted between
this case and Three D Corp., only one of which is addressed in
the Court of Appeals1 written opinion.

First, there was an

actual physical "taking" here by virtue of the inadvertent
encroachment during construction of the footings and retaining
wall, whereas in Three D Corp. there was no actual physical
taking based on the construction of a curb by Salt Lake City
which did not encroach upon the plaintiffs1 property.

However,

the second major factual distinction between the two cases, which
was overlooked by the Court of Appeals, is the fact that
plaintiffs in this case were given the opportunity to make a full
presentation of their theory of loss of access and loss of
parking to the jury, but the weight of that testimony and the
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determination as to whether a compensable injury had occurred
should not be disturbed merely because the jury was not persuaded
by plaintiffs1 evidence.
In its opinion in this case, the Court of Appeals agreed
that nthe issue of reasonable access as it affects a
determination of severance damages is dependent on the particular
facts and circumstances of each case."

127 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18

(Citing State Road Commission v Christensen, 371 P.2d 552, 556
(Utah 1962), emphasis added).
Substantial evidence was presented by plaintiffs to the jury
in this case regarding their claims of loss of reasonable access
to the property and loss of parking.

Both plaintiff Kenneth

MacQueen and plaintiffs1 expert Jack DeMaas testified about the
specific nature and degree of the interference and alleged
unreasonableness of the loss of maneuverability and parking by
virtue of the state's exercise of control over the entirety of
its right of way in conjunction with the expansion of Redwood
Road.

Plaintiff Kenneth MacQueen crystallized the issue in his

testimony by confirming that it was the loss of access and
parking, regardless of the construction of the footings and
retaining wall that created the problem from his perspective
(Tr. 48-49).
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Plaintiffs1 expert, Mr. DeMaas testified access was not
reasonable as a result of construction of the highway widening
project (Tr. 103).
The jury was properly instructed as to the applicable legal
principles, even considered in light of the later decision of the
Court of Appeals in Three D Corp.

Several instructions dealt

specifically with the plaintiffs1 right of reasonable access and
instructed the jury that an unreasonable interference with or
impairment of that right was compensable as part of severance
damages.

(See jury instructions 18, 20, 21 and 22 attached as

Exhibit E to the Appendix).
In light of the totality of circumstances presented here,
including the extensive testimony of plaintiffs and their experts
and the instructions given to the jury, the persuasiveness and
weight to be given that conflicting testimony is clearly within
the province of the jury and should not be disturbed.
POINT II
SHOULD THE JURY'S CALCULATION AS TO THE AMOUNT OF SEVERANCE
DAMAGES, BE REVERSED ON APPEAL MERELY BECAUSE REASONABLE
MINDS MIGHT DIFFER AS TO THE WEIGHT TO BE GIVEN TO SUCH
EVIDENCE WHEN THE CALCULATION WAS BASED ON PROPER INSTRUCTIONS
FROM THE TRIAL COURT AND WAS SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT
EVIDENCE ADMITTED WITHOUT OBJECTION?
The trial court properly instructed the jury in this matter
on the method to be used in calculating damages or just
compensation and the measure of severance damages as being the
difference between the value of the remaining property before and
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after the taking.

(See Jury Instructions 13, 14, 15, 16, and

17, which are attached as Exhibit "F" to the Appendix).

The

damage or just compensation award ultimately returned by the jury
included the nominal value of the minimal amount of land actually
taken by encroachment of the footings and retaining wall, the
value attributed to the construction easement and an amount
representing severance damages to the remaining portion of the
property of $4,543.00.

The jury award was within the range of

testimony of the experts.
The jury instructions and testimony of the appraisers must
be taken and applied as a whole, particularly given the unique
nature of the questions presented here and the difficulty in
separating and differentiating between plaintiffs1 claims with
respect to loss of access and parking as opposed to other
elements of damage or just compensation.
Defendants1 appraiser testified that the value of the
property, including land and buildings, prior to the date of
taking was $306,000 based on a combination of market, cost and
income approaches (Tr. 271-292).

He further testified that the

plaintiffs1 property had depreciated because of functional
obsolescence which he explained to be problems inherent in the
buildings as originally constructed for the purpose of
manufacturing munitions (Tr. 278-282).
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The buildings were constructed twenty (20) feet from the
west boundary of the property (which is also the state's rightof-way line) and thirty-eight (38) feet from the traveled way
prior to the construction project.

When the property was con-

verted from manufacturing to commercial use, the owner was faced
with the problem of parking which was resolved at that time by,
in effect, "borrowing" the use of the state's right-of-way in
front of the building for maneuvering in order to obtain ingress
and egress, as well as occasionally for parking (Tr. 44-45, 48).
Cars parking directly in front of the building sometimes extended
into the State's existing right-of-way.

(See portion of Trial

Exhibit 18, reproduced for demonstrative purposes and attached as
Exhibit G to the Appendix).
When it became necessary for the State to make full use of
and exercise control over the entirety of its right-of-way for
the best advantage of the public as traffic needs warranted, that
inherent functional obsolescence became operational.

The

state's expert testified that the functional obsolescence was not
caused by the "taking" but by the original change from
manufacturing to commercial use (Tr. 292-293).
Therefore, the actual value of the property was essentially
the same before the taking as it was after the taking, with the
exception of the elements of damage or just compensation
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identified in his testimony, to include an award of $4,543.00 for
severance damages (Tr. 309-310).
The testimony of the state's appraiser with respect to the
cost of landscaping the front of the building as representing the
differential value before and after the taking was subject to
thorough and vigorous exploration on cross-examination at trial.
However, a complete review of the entire portion of the
transcript dealing with his testimony demonstrates that it was
based on before and after market values taking into consideration
all relevant facts on which that was based, and a satisfactory
explanation was provided on cross-examination as to how the
witness arrived at his conclusions.
The testimony of the State's appraiser, Mr. Lang, was interrupted by a recess at the conclusion of one day of the trial and
resumed the following day.

As a result, it is necessary to read

the entirety of his testimony in arriving at a determination as
to whether it is relevant, admissible and sufficient to support
the jury award.

Mr. Lang began the discussion with respect to

the various components and basis for his determination as to the
values before and after the taking late one afternoon of the
trial.

The trial was recessed for the evening and his direct

examination concluded the following day.

That testimony included

the method and manner for calculating the total damage award,
consisting of the value of the property actually taken by
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construction of the footings and retaining wall, the value of a
temporary construction easement and an award for severance
damages based on the cost for landscaping the area in front of
the building to correct any damage caused by construction of the
project, for a total damage award or just compensation in the
amount of $5,410.00.

He testified that was the difference in the

I
value of the property before and after the taking (Tr. 309-310;
Trial Exhibit 49 attached as Exhibit "D" to the Appendix).
Merely because the differential in before and after values
may be minimal should not obscure the basic soundness of that
approach, which was appropriately and satisfactorily explained
and defended under vigorous cross-examination.

The degree to

which it is persuasive is clearly a question of weight properly
for the trier of fact and not an appropriate basis for a trial or
appellate judge to substitute his or her judgment for that of the
jury.
Not to be overlooked in the context of this question is the
realization that the plaintiffs1 expert appraiser offered
extensive testimony reflecting his own opinions on the issue of
the amount of $137,000.00 as severance damages which ought to be
awarded and his conclusion, as reflected in Trial Exhibit 39
which is attached as Exhibit C to the Appendix, advocated an
award in that amount.

As a result, the award of compensation for

severance damages was within the estimate of values given by the
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expert witnesses and therefore is supported by the evidence.
Utah Department of Transportation v Jones, 694 P.2d 1031, 1033
(Utah 1984).
CONCLUSION
Where, as here, a party has been given an opportunity to
thoroughly litigate a claim at trial and receive the jury's
decision thereon, an appellate court should not disturb the
jury's conclusion merely on the basis that reasonable minds might
differ as to the outcome.

Quite to the contrary, the evidence

should be viewed in the light most favorable to the party who
prevailed at trial in determining whether it is sufficient to
support a verdict.

Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah

1988).
For all the reasons set forth above, defendant-respondent
State of Utah requests that this Court grant its Petition for
Writ of Certiorari in order to review the important questions
presented with respect to the factual determinations made by the
jury at trial in this case on the questions of loss of access,
parking and the amount of severance damages.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

^^

day of March, 1990.

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

^4*t&

Jody K B\
Attorney^ /forDefendant-Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four (4) true and correct copies of
the foregoing Petition were mailed first class, postage prepaid
on this 20th day of March, 1990, to the following counsel of
record:
Clark W. Sessions
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS
First Interstate Plaza - #400
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1605
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EXHIBIT A

FILED

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOoo
The Carpet Barn, a Utah
corporation; Kenneth MacQueen
and Harla MacQueen,

JAN 2 41990
OPINION
B'k Of fr # COLVt

(For Publication)

P Cou-'i <r. Appeals

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Case No.

v.

890315-CA

State of Utah, by an,, through
its Department of
Transpc.tation, John Nye and
John Do. 1 through X,
Defendants and Respondents.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Frank G. Noel
Attorneys:

Clark W. Sessions and John F. Clark, Salt Lake
City, for Appellants
R. Paul Van Dam and Stephen C. Ward, Salt Lake
City, for Respondent, State of Utah
Jody K. Burnett and Anne Swensen, Salt Lake City,
for Respondent, State of Utah

Before Judges Garff, Greenwood, and Orme.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Appellants, The Carpet Barn, Kenneth MacQueen, and Harla
MacQueen, appeal from a final judgment in their favor for
"inverse condemnation" and severance damages, and from denial
of their motion for additur or, in the alternative, for a new
trial. We reverse and remand.
In 1971, the MacQueens purchased the subject property at
3725 Redwood Road, in Salt Lake City. The MacQueens have
operated a retail carpet and floor covering outlet, called "The
Carpet Barn,M on the property since 1971. The property has 192
feet of frontage on the west side of Redwood Road. The State
maintained a right-of-way line on Redwood Road twenty feet from
the front of the Carpet Barn building and thirty-eight feet

from the traveled way. Since 1971, appellants and their
customers have used the right-of-way to enter and exit the
property. This allowed Carpet Barn's patrons to park in front
of the building and maneuver into traffic without using the
traveled asphalt portion of the then existing Redwood Road.
Available parking spaces in front of the building numbered
between fifteen and twenty.
In 1984, the Utah Department of Transportation negotiated
with appellants to acquire a strip of property along the
frontage of their property for a highway widening project.
Appellants refused the State's offer and the road widening
plans were altered to proceed without acquiring appellants'
property. The State constructed a retaining wall across the
front of appellants' property along the right-of-way boundary.
The wall ranged from sixteen inches to two feet high and was
topped by a four-foot high chain link fence. The fence was
removed prior to the time of trial. When the road project was
completed it was discovered that footings constructed by the
State encroached on appellants' property six inches. Access to
appellants' property was limited by the retaining wall to a
twenty-foot wide driveway which ran from Redwood Road to the
rear of appellants' property. The State's minimum requirement
for commercial driveways is twenty-five feet. The wall built
by the State prevented parking in front of the building,
eliminating the fifteen to twenty diagonal parking spaces.
At trial, the jury was instructed that appellants'
property had been taken. The jury awarded $289 for the fair
market value of the property taken by construction of the
footings on appellants' property and $578 for the fair market
value of the temporary construction easement. The jury also
awarded $4,543 in severance damages to the remaining property
not taken by the State. Appellants filed a motion for additur
or in the alternative for a new trial based on the jury's
alleged misapplication of the proper formula in calculating
severance damages. The court denied the motion. Appellants
now appeal.
On appeal, we address the following issues: (1) is the
jury verdict for severance damages supported by sufficient
evidence and was it properly calculated? (2) did the court err
by admitting evidence of the cost to landscape? (3) did the
court err by excluding appellants' evidence concerning the
chain link fence and access to other properties? and (4) did
the court err by failing to give appellants' requested jury
instructions?
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INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
On appeal, when a trial court's denial of a motion for a
new trial is challenged on the basis that there was
insufficient evidence to support the verdict, "we reverse only
if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
party who prevailed, we conclude that the evidence is
insufficient to support the verdict." Hansen v. $tpw?rfr- 761
P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988)• Generally speaking, a jury award for
compensation in an eminent domain case is supported by
competent evidence "if the award of compensation was within the
estimate of alue given by one of the expert witnesses." Utah
Dep't of Trar;p. v. Jones, 694 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Utah 1984). A
similar standard applies in a jury award for severance
damages.
Severance damages have been defined as "those caused by
the taking of a portion of the parcel of property where the
taking or the construction of the improvement on that part
causes injury to that portion of the parcel not taken." Utah
Dep't of Transp. v. D'Ambrosio, 743 P.2d 1220, 1222 (Utah 1987)
(emphasis in original). The trial court properly instructed
the jury that the measure of severance damages is the
difference between the value of the remaining property prior to
the taking and the value of the remaining property after the
taking. See Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Ravco Corp.. 599 P.2d
481, 489-90 (Utah 1979). See also Herring v. Platte River
Power Auth., 728 P.2d 709, 711 (Colo. 1986). The right of
access is an easement appurtenant to land of an abutting owner
on a street, and constitutes a property right which may not be
taken without just compensation. Utah State Rd. Comm'n v.
Miva, 526 P.2d 926, 928-29 (Utah 1974). Also, a jury award for
condemnation compensation is not supported by the evidence
where based on inadmissible evidence. Jones, 694 P.2d at 1033.
In this case, Appellants' expert witness testified that
the value of the property prior to the taking was $225,684;
that the State's action changed the highest and best use of the
property from commerical to light industrial; and that, as a
result, the value of the property after the taking was
$88,905. Had the jury adopted appellants' calculations,
severance damages would be the difference — $137,778.
The State's appraiser testified that the value of the
property prior to the taking was $306,000. He did not estimate
the value of the property after the taking; instead, he
testified that the property had depreciated because of
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functional obsolescence, which he explained to be problems
inherent in the building as originally constructed. The
State's expert testified that when appellants converted the
property from manufacturing use to commercial use after their
1971 purchase, they resolved their parking needs by using the
State's right-of-way for parking. As a result, the State did
not create the problem, but when it elected to utilize its
existing right-of-way, the functional obsolescence, which had
lain dorment since 1971, became operational. Therefore,
according to the State's expert, the actual value of the
property was the same before the taking as it was after the
taking. He opined further that although the State's action
impaired appellants' long established practice of utilizing
their property for store-front parking, the State was not the
legal cause of appellants' injury. The State's expert
testified that appellants could provide substitute parking by
tearing down a structure and converting the space to parking at
a cost of $25,000, and erecting a replacement structure for
$98,000. In addition, he testified, over objection, that it
would cost $4,543 to properly landscape in front of the
building, next to the wall erected by the State.
The jury awarded $4,543 for severance damages, the exact
amount that the State testified was needed to landscape the
front of the building. Appellants contend that the $4,543
figure adopted by the jury was improper as it is not the
difference in value of the property before and after the
taking, but only the cost for curing the front yard
appearance. The State counters that testimony regarding
landscaping had nothing to do with curing the parking problem
but was offered as a means of increasing the value of the
unusable parking strip. Consequently, argues the State, by
awarding the cost of landscaping as severance damages,
appellants were in the same financial position both before and
after the taking, in terms of the property they were legally
entitled to use.
The State's argument that it was not the legal cause of
diminution of market value of appellants' property runs counter
to Three D Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 1321, 1326 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988). The facts in Three D Corp. are similar to the
case at hand. Salt Lake City, after unsuccessfully attempting
to purchase a portion of appellants' property, extended the
street surface to the existing legal boundary and constructed a
solid curb along nearly the entire length of appellants'
property, where before there had been continuous and accessible
frontage along the street. As a result, appellants were
deprived of most of their former parking spaces. This court
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held that there is a right to compensation where the State's
action, although not directly constituting a physical taking,
"substantially impaired appellants' long-standing right to
utilize their property for store-front parking and has caused
them direct, peculiar injury" and consequent devaluation of
their commercial property, I£. Three D Corp. noted that if
the city had condemned part of appellants' property to
construct a sidewalk, it would clearly have been required to
compensate the owners for the decrease in value "attributable
to the lost parking spaces." Id. at 1323 n.l. Similarly, in
this case, the State's construction of the wall extending along
the legal right-of-way line deprived appellants of their
long-standing right to utilize part of their property for
store-front parking, thus entitling them to compensation for
any decrease in value caused by the loss of parking spaces.
The State argues that Three D Corp. is inapplicable to
this case because there was an actual taking here, albeit an
inadverdent one because of the six-inch error in placement of
the footings. By contrast, in Three D Corp., there was no
actual taking because the curb constructed by Salt Lake City
did not encroach on Three D's property. While this factual
distinction exists, the State's argument is misguided. If
compensation for lost parking spaces was appropriate in Three
D. Corp. even absent a physical taking, surely it is
appropriate in this case, where it is undisputed that a
physical taking occurred.
Appellants are entitled to severance damages calculated
as the difference in value of the property before and after
severance, to include consideration of the lost parking spaces,
as well as any decrease in market value because of limited
access. The jury was instructed, without objection, that the
differential in market value was the appropriate formula.1
The jury's award of $4,543, however, is the cost to landscape
the front of the building, irrelevant to the proper formula for
determining damages, and not competent evidence of market
value. Moreover, it does not fall within the range of
1. Because there was no objection to the court's instruction
on the method of calculating severance damages, we need not
determine whether this is the only permissible damage formula.
See, however, the concurring opinion of Justice Hall and
dissenting opinions of Justices Stewart and Crockett in Utah
Dep't of Transp. v. Ravco Corp., 599 P.2d 481, 493-96 (Utah
1979) .
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estimates of either expert.
supported by the evidence.2

Therefore, the jury's award is not

EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE
Appellants next claim the court erred in excluding
evidence of the chain link fence erected by the State and of
access allowed other comparable properties. In reviewing
questions of admissibility of evidence at trial, we give
deference to the trial court and will not overturn its ruling
absent an abuse of discretion. Whitehead v. American Motors
Sales Corp., 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 28 (1989).
Appellants argue that exclusion of the chain link fence
evidence denies them the benefit of having the jury consider
their fullest measure of damages. The chain link fence was a
temporary obstruction, however, which was removed prior to the
time of trial. Moreover, the fence had no effect on the loss
of parking spaces. We conclude that the trial court correctly
determined that evidence of the fence was irrelevant in
calculating severance damages.
Appellants also claim that they were prejudiced by the
exclusion of evidence of access allowed to other comparable
properties since a major element of their severance damages was
that the limitation of access and loss of parking spaces
necessarily changed the highest and best use of the property
from commercial to light industrial. We agree with the State
that the issue of reasonable access as it affects a
determination of severance damages is dependent on the
particular facts and circumstances of each case. See State Rd.
Comm'n v. Christensen, 13 Utah 2d 224, 371 P.2d 552, 556 (1962)
(proximity and severance damages paid to a neighboring property
owner, absent a showing of complete similarity, are dependent
on the facts and circumstances of each case); see also State
Rd. Comm'n v. Taqqart, 19 Utah 2d 247, 430 P.2d 167, 170
(1967). Because appellants failed to demonstrate complete
similarity between the other properties and their own
circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to allow evidence of access afforded other properties,
especially since such evidence would have little bearing on the
2. It follows that the State's expert's testimony about
landscaping costs, objected to by appellants, was erroneously
admitted. In the posture of this case, such testimony was
irrelevant to a calculation of the difference in market value
before and after the severance.
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question of the diminished value of this property as a result
of the severance.
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Because an appeal challenging the refusal to give jury
instructions presents questions of law only, we grant no
particular deference to the trial court's rulings. Ramon v.
Farr, 770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1989).
A party is entitled to have his theories
of the case submitted to the jury provided
there is competent evidence to support
them. Failure to give requested
instructions is reversible error if it
tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice
of the complaining party or erroneously
advises on the law.
Mikkelsen v. Haslam, 764 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
(citations omitted).
Appellants first object to the trial court's failure to
give proffered Instruction No. 26, which states: "You are
instructed that the evidence in this case is that the State of
Utah did not attempt, in any way, to restrict highway access of
the Carpet Barn property until August, 1985." Appellants
sought by Instruction No. 26 to give the jury a starting point
to calculate severance damages. Instruction No. 16, however,
which was given to the jury, states that the fair market value
of the property "will be determined as of the 27th day of
August, 1985,- and provides the jury the appropriate date from
which to calculate damages. Further, whether the State ever
attempted to utilize its right-of-way prior to the date of the
actual taking is irrelevant to the calculation of severance
damages.
Appellants also object to the elimination of language
from their proffered Instructions No's. 25 and 28. The
language eliminated was to the effect that rights of ingress
and egress and rights to access, light, and air could be
"established by long-term use or travel." We find that a
reading of these two instructions, absent the language
eliminated still adequately reflects appellants' theory. We
conclude that any error in refusing to include this language in
the proferred instructions was harmless. See Utah R. Civ. P.
61.
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REVERSE AND REMAND
The Utah Supreme Court has held that an appellate court
may order an additur, or in the alternative, a new trial in
appropriate circumstances. Dupuis v. Nielson, 624 P.2d 685,
686 (Utah 1981); Bodon v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 42, 327 P.2d 826,
828 (1958). We are unwilling to order an additur in this
matter, as urged by appellants, because the evidence indicates
a possible broad variance in appropriate severance damages. We
recognize, further, that trial courts are in a much better
position to evaluate all the nuances of a case than is an
appellate court. See Three D Corp., 752 P.2d at 1326; Halladay
v. Cluff, 739 P.2d 643, 645 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). We,
therefore, reverse and remand this case for a new trial or such
other proceedings as might be appropriate in accordance with
the views expressed in this opinion.

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

890315-CA

8

;ASE TITLE:
The Carpet Barn# a Utah corporation;
Cenneth MacQueen and Harla MacQueen,
Plaintiffs and Appellants/
r.
>tate of Utah/ by and through its
)epartment of Transportation/
rohn Nye and John Does 1 through X,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.

890315-CA

>ARTIES:
Hark W. S e s s i o n s
(Argued)
rohn F. C l a r k
attorney for Appellants
100 First Federal Plaza
>05 East 200 South
>alt Lake City/ Utah
84102
I. Paul Van Dam
Jtate Attorney General
Stephen C. Ward
Assistant Attorney General
536 State Capitol Building
i U I L D I N G
M A I L
Tody K. Burnett (Argued)
Vnne Swensen
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
attorneys for Respondents
L0 Exchange Place/ Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
S a l t Lake C i t y / Utah
84111
rRIAL JUDGE:
ionorable Frank G. Noel
January 24, 1990. OPINION (For Publication)
This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted/ and the
Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is now
ordered, adjudged and decreed that the 'judgment of the district
court herein be, and the same is, reversed and remanded for
further proceedings in accordance with the views expressed in
the opinion filed herein.
Opinion of the Court by PAMELA T. GREENWOOD/ Judge; REGNAL
W. GARFF/ and GREGORY K. ORME/ Judges/ concur.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of January, 1990, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing OPINION was deposited in the United
States mail or personally delivered to each of the above parties.
^

TRIAL COURT:

7^ &•&/&/
Deputy Clerk

Salt Lake Third District Court No. C-86-1963

/.<^
/

EXHIBIT B

FILED IN CI. r ~ ' ^ C-^CE
SaitLakr
•'

OCT* 7 1987
H. Dixon WiW;

JODY K BURNETT (A0499) '--. Z_2 .'--^j-* \
ANNE SWENSEN (A4252)
*~
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendants
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

By

... .curt

DA*«
_\<\± ALP

STEPHEN C. WARD (A3384)
Assistant Attorney General
124 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84li4
Telephone: (801) 533-6684

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE

THE CARPET BARN, a Utah
corporation; et al.,

OF

UTAH

JUDGMENT ON
SPECIAL VERDICT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
C^.vil No. C86-1963

STATE OF UTAH, et al.,
Defendants.

JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL

THIS MATTER came on regularly for jury trial before the aboveentitled court, the Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding, on
September 28-30, 1987. Plaintiffs were represented by Clark W.
Sessions and John F. Clark of the firm of Sessions & Moore.
Defendants were represented by Jody K Burnett and Anne Swenson of
Snow, Christensen & Martineau, as well as Assistant Attorney General
Stephen C. Ward.

EXHIBIT "B

A jury of eight persons was regularly impaneled and sworn to
try said action.

Plaintiffs and defendants introduced evidence

through the testimony of witnesses and introduction of exhibits.
After hearing the evidence, the instructions of the court, and
the argument of counsel, the matter was submitted to the jury for
consideration of their verdict.

The jury having duly deliberated,

returned a special verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendants as follows:
1.

The fair market value of the property taken by
construction of underground footings and a
retaining wall onto plaintiffs' property:

2.

The fair market value of the temporary
construction easement:

3.

$ 289.00

$ 578.00

Severance damages, if any, to remaining land:

$ 4,543.00

Total damages to plaintiffs

$ 5,410.00

In accordance with Rule 58A of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and based upon the Special Verdict returned by the jury
in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendants, and good
cause appearing therefor, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment be and the same
is hereby entered in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendants
in the amount of Five Thousand Four

Hundred Ten Dollars, ($5,410.00)

together with interest at the rate of eight percent (8%) per annum,

-2-

from and after the 27th day of August, 1985, until the date of
judgment, and then interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%)
per annum thereafter until paid.
DATED this
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f

£L

1987.
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District Judge

ATTEST

Approved as to form:

H. DIXCN HiMDI.EY
Clerk

"CTark W. Sessions^4^-^
Attorney for Plaintiffs

By

-3-

hi 4QK.
r

Deputy Cteitt

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

STATE OF

UTAH

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
) ss.
)

SHARON M. ALLHANDS., being first duly sworn, states that
she is employed with the law offices of Snow, Christensen &
Martineau, attorneys for

Defendants

herein; that she served the attached

in Case Number

C-86-1963

, in

Judgment on Special Verdict

Third Judicial District

Court, upon the following parties by placing a true and correct
copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Clark W. Sessions
Sessions & Moore
400 First Federal Plaza
505 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84102

and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid,
on the

6th

day of

October

Q , , 198J7_- ^

V LllJULJ
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o j s ^ f o r e me t h i s
0 C t O b e r

6 th

198

^^yCMy Commission Expires:

Notary Public
Resident of the State of Utah

EXHIBIT C

FRANK GTBLA
APPRA

iNSHXP
>t£R
/

b|R MARKET VALUE OF LAND TAKEN

&27-

#

VALUE OF LAND BEFORE
VALUE OF LAND AFTER TAKI! >

*

td

1

o

n /

-:''5",&?<£r->
7

DIFFERENCE

m
x

i

*

TOTAL OPINION

I f

N

* lyZcoo
*j37

r

/

EXHIBIT D

WILLIAM l i k H ^ MAI

Bera?£ \&LUE
U

^>

* 211,005

l|iAFBOVfeMSvn-S
95000
10[M_ BER>EE VALUE ^ 3 0 6 , 0 0 0
i5mL £Fn=R MLUE * 3 0 0 > 5 7 5

VMUG c r PAST TTVI^NI

* itf

1BTRL All/AKD

*54I0

Tenu. Beroi2^ VIUAJE
300^000
LESS T&TW- &FTER. VALUE 3 0 0 ^ 5 7 5

« * « TOTAL A W K R D * 5 ^
EXHIBIT "Fl"

EXHIBIT E

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lak« Countv. I itah

SEP 3 0 1987
B y J J I -

'—T

0»putyCler*

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE CARPET BARN, a Utah
c o r p o r a t i o n , KENNETH MACQUEEN
and HARLA MACQUEEN,

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY

Plaintiffs

CI\|lL NO. C-86-1963

vs .
STATE OF UTAH, by and through i t s
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
JOHN NYE and JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH X,

Defendants

Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury:

(See I n s t r u c t i o n s No. 1 to No.

FYWTRTT

liei,

).

INSTRUCTION NO._Jj?_

You are instructed that the law recognizes that a landowner
whose

property

fronts

on

a public

reasonable access to the highway.

highway

has

a right of

INSTRUCTION NO.

^w

The State has authority to adopt and enforce regulations
governing the use of and access to public highway rights of way,
including regulations governing the location, number and width of
driveways providing access to and from adjoining land.

However,

the State is prohibited by law from exercising this authority in
a way that unreasonably interferes with or impairs an established
right

of

ingress

and egress to property

highway.

/J$

adjoining

a public

fJ&Cl£&

Where an owner of adjoining land has rights of ingress and
egress to a public highway and those rights are unreasonably
impaired by the adoption of State regulations or the enforcement
of those regulations, that owner is entitled to just compensation
by way of severance damages for the unreasonable restriction of
his right of access.

INSTRUCTION NO.

The

rights

of

access,

light,

and

air

are

easements

appurtenant to the land of an abutting owner on a street; they
constitute property rights forming part of the owner's estate.
These substantial property rights, although subject to reasonable
regulation, may not be taken away or unreasonably impaired by the
State without the payment of just compensation.
Where, in connection with an actual taking of an abutting
property owner's property, the erection of a permanent structure
as a part of a public highway results in the impairment of or
damage to the abutting property owner's easements of access,
light, and air, that damage or impairment are relevant factors
properly considered in determining severance damages.

n

/
is

INSTRUCTION NO,

2^

If you find that the design and construction of the highway
project in front of the Carpet Barn property, including the
placement and size of the curb-cut driveways, the construction
and location of the retaining wall, unreasonably restricted or
interfered with the right of access, light and view appurtenant
to that property, then you must take this

into account in

assessing severance damage even though the design of the highway
may have been otherwise reasonable from the point of view of
highway design and construction standards!.

EXHIBIT F

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE

Salt Lak« County. Utah
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE CARPET BARN, a Utah
c o r p o r a t i o n , KENNETH MACQUEEN
and HARLA MACQUEEN,

Plaintiffs

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY
CI\llL NO. C-86-1963

vs .
STATE OF UTAH, by and through i t s
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
JOHN NYE and JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH X,

Defendants

Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury:

(See I n s t r u c t i o n s No. 1 to No

INSTRUCTION NO.

{%

"Just compensation," as used in these instructions, is such
a sum of money as will make the Landowners whole, so that upon
receipt of the same they will be no poorer and no richer by
reason of the taking of their property and the related damaged
than they would be if the same were not taken•

Frequently, such

just compensation is spoken of as damages, and when the word
"damages" is used in these instructions, you are to keep in mind
that it has reference to "just compensation" as in these instructions defined.

INSTRUCTION NO-

I^

You are instructed that just compensation is to be paid to
the landowners for the loss of their property and improvements
and the damage caused by the construction of the highway project.
The term "just compensation" is defined as the sum of:

(1) the

fair market value of the property taken by the State, and (2) the
severance damages accruing to the remaining property not taken
caused by such taking and the construction of the highway project
in the manner designed and built.
Accordingly, the following questions will be answered by you
in your deliberations in this matter:
1.

As of August 27, 1985, what was the fair market value

of the property owned by The Carpet Barn, Kenneth MacQueen and
Harla MacQueen, taken by the State of Utah?
2.

What was the fair market value of the construction

easement taken by the State for the use of plaintiffs1 land for
construction purposes?
3.

As of August 27, 1985, what are the severance damages,

if any, to the remaining property of these landowners resulting
from

the

above-described

taking

and the construction

of the

highway project as designed and built?

O

INSTRUCTION NO.

'

If you should determine plaintiffs are entitled to an award
of severance damages, the court instructs the jury that the
following method is to be employed in determining damages to the
remaining property by reason of its severance from that property
acquired by the Department of Transportation.

You shall consider

the value of the remaining property before the severance of the
part acquired and, second, the value of such remaining property
after severance.
the

taking

is

If the value of the remaining property after
less than the value before the taking, this

reduction in value is to be considered as severance damage.

INSTRUCTION NO.

\&

The term "fair market value11 of the property of Kenneth
MacQueen and Harla MacQueen under consideration herein, both
BEFORE and AFTER condemnation, is defined as that price which
such property will bring for sale by one who is informed and
desires, but is not obligated, to sell and is bought by one who
is informed and desires, but is not obligated, to purchase the
same, said property being exposed in the market for a reasonable
length of time.
Fair market value, as herein defined, will be det^rniivi *s
of the 27th day of August, 1985.

Those conditions that etc

normally incident to and effect the sale of property by willing
and informed private buyers and sellers in the open market are to
be applied in the measurement of market v^lue, both BEFORE and
AFTER condemnation by the State.

J

INSTRUCTION NO.

|0

In determining the fair market value of the Landowners1
property both BEFORE and AFTER condemnation by the State, one of
the primary elements is the consideration of that use to which
the property would have been placed as of August 27, 1985, and
within the reasonably foreseeable future in order to obtain the
greatest return to the Landowners.

Such is generally referred to

as the highest and best use of the property.

The highest and

best use of the Landowners1 property often is, but is not necessarily limited to the actual use being made of the property as of
the time in question, but rather, it is that use to which a buyer
and seller would be most apt to place the property at the time in
question and in the reasonably foreseeable future, having due
regard for market considerations, the normal business demands and
wants of the community, and the actual and potential use that
would have been reasonably known.
As part of your consideration of the highest and best use in
this case, you may take into account the actual use being made of
the subject property in recent years and as of August 27, 1985,
the location of the property, its zoning in Salt Lake County,
frontage to and access upon Redwood Road, the upkeep, maintenance, condition and development of axw rnwiPJLa^ properties, and
all other factors from a fair preponderance of the evidence you
find that a willing buyer and seller would take into account in
establishing the highest and best use of the property as of
August 27, 1985 and in the reasonably foreseeable future.

EXHIBIT G

EXHIBIT "6

